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ABSTRACT Financialization is a major trend in Western economies. This paper shows, on the one
hand, how it changes the management criteria and, on the other hand, the limits to financialization in
the property sector. Between 1992 and 2004, about 15% of Swiss pension funds’ wealth was invested
in property. As far as their investment policy is concerned, pension funds have two choices. First,
they can directly own, and have management responsibility for, the properties in their portfolios.
Alternatively, they can buy shares in mainly Zurich-based investment vehicles. In the first case,
pension funds require staff with the relevant expertise along with the knowledge of property
markets. Investments have a regional focus and are assessed internally by the funds. In the
second case, pension funds are merely investors and investment appraisals and comparisons are
made on the basis of market criteria such as yield, diversification in relation to risk and liquidity.
In this case, property investments focus solely on the country’s main urban areas.
1. Introduction
The actions of property market players are widely responsible for the way the built environ-
ment develops and evolves. Pension funds in Switzerland have grown hugely over the last
20 years and they are now one of the property sector’s important financers and players. An
appreciation of the way pension funds are organized, the channels through which their
investments are made and the reasoning behind their decisions has become indispensable
for understanding developments in the Swiss property sector. In order to examine these
issues, this paper discusses the channels used by Swiss pension funds for financing the prop-
erty sector and how they have evolved and developed since 1994. In view of a whole series
of measures taken over the last few years and which are aimed at financializing the property
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sector, the purpose of this study is to examine property market issues surrounding financia-
lization. These include the impact of pension funds on property investment in Switzerland,
the extent to which it has become financialized and the effects of this process. It also
involves answering questions about the types of investment that are favoured (commercial
developments as opposed to housing or communal as opposed to individual living spaces)
and whether the path followed by institutional investors favours certain types of spaces at the
expense of others. Given the changes this brought about, it can be asked how pension funds
involved in property reacted to them; what were their effect on management criteria and the
geographical spread of investments; how did players’ behaviour respond to these changes?
The theoretical design of our study is mainly inspired, on one side, by the work of Clark
(2000, 2003) who has studied the decision-making process and the functioning of pension
funds industry in various Anglo-Saxon countries and on the other side, by the work of
Martin and Minns (1995) who has examined the regional consequences of the concen-
tration of pension fund industry in London and the South East in the UK. The research
is based on an analysis of data collected by the Swiss Federal Statistics Office (SFSO)
together with private sector data (surveys by Ernst & Young, Lusenti, Robeco and
Swissca conducted between 1997 and 2004). Around 20 semi-structured interviews
were carried out with players in the sector in the spring of 2005. In addition, a panel of
13 experts met twice: first in the autumn of 2004 in order to check the hypotheses and
to identify relevant information sources and providers, and secondly in the autumn of
2005 in order to give critical viewpoints on the researches content and results.
The first section summarizes shortly the theories dealing with both finance and geogra-
phy. The second section provides a brief outline of the importance of pension funds in the
Swiss property sector. Then the two channels of investment used by pension funds for
property finance are compared. One channel can be described as direct and non-financia-
lized while the other is indirect and financialized. Both differ strongly from each other with
regard to players involved, spatial organization and investment criteria. Then, having
looked at the operational and spatial processes at work within these channels, a number
of limits to property sector financialization are highlighted. The fourth and final part con-
cludes by emphasizing the nature and impact of the current financialization process on
pension funds’ property investments.
2. Financialization, the Economy and the Property Market
In this first part, we introduce briefly theories that deal with the spatial and structural trans-
formations of the financial system as well as the consequences on the “real” economy and
its geography. Then we look at financialization within the economy and the property sector
from a theoretical perspective and on how financialization developed in the Swiss property
sector through a series of legal changes during the year 2000. Finally, we show that the
management criteria of return, risk and liquidity have very different meaning between
the financialized circuits and the traditional one.
2.1 Reconfiguring the Financial Systems and Space
Financial markets play an increasingly important role in the contemporary economies. At
the same time, banking systems and financial markets are today being restructured. As a
result, a new economic geography of finance is emerging. These transformations of finan-
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cial systems are not without consequences on the economic and spatial development of a
country.
The “Global City” approach (Sassen, 1991) shows, for example, how financial activities
have developed in a highly concentrated manner. This process of spatial centralization and
concentration within the financial system calls into question, at the other extreme, the
growth and particularly the autonomy of local banking systems. According to Dow
(1999), financial system liberalization policies have played a not insignificant role in
these transformations. Indeed, on the one hand, within environments where capital circu-
lates more freely, the quest/preference for liquidity is what attracts increasing financial
flows to the financial markets. On the other hand, set against a background of increased
competition, local or regional banks are experiencing some difficulties. Some disappear
altogether or are bought up by larger banks. This decline is weakening the power to
create money within peripheral areas (Dow & Rodriguez-Fuentes, 1997), or at the very
least, considerably is reducing local and autonomous decision-making powers, with
banks/bank branches acting above all as an access point for savings (Crevoisier, 2001).
These various factors ultimately reinforce the vulnerability of the outlying regions,
especially those ones made up of SMEs (Dow, 1999; Pollard, 2003; Klagge & Martin,
2005). The absence, or progressive decline, of traditional funding channels in these
regions could seriously impede their development.
Moreover, in a context of profound transformation in traditional funding circuits—the
breakdown of regional financial channels and the concentration of financial activities in a
country’s main financial centre(s)—the growing power of institutional investors makes a
considerable contribution to increasing regional imbalances. Thus, Martin and Minns
(1995) succeed in showing that the increasing power of British pension funds at the end
of the 1980s had the effect of strongly magnifying regional imbalances in that country.
Savings deposits are collected in a homogenous manner across the whole territory, but
they are funnelled off into financial institutions that are mainly in the south-east of the
country. Next, these funds are invested mainly on the London stock market and only
listed companies—basically the large companies—benefit from them. In practice,
almost nothing is reinvested in the other regions of the country.
In short, the passage to a financial market economy and the spatial reorganization of the
financial system support the spatial concentration of the financial activities. In parallel, one
attends the decline more or less marked of the traditional circuits of financing. Therefore,
the move to a financial market economy favours certain types of space (financial centres)
to the disadvantage of others (areas specializing in traditional, industrial or tourist indus-
tries which are either outdated or have fallen out of fashion). It also favours certain types of
players (large companies and financial players) at the expense of others (SMEs, small
savers, etc.) along with certain types of investments (comparable and large-scale projects)
as opposed to other projects (those which are small-scale, venture capital, etc.) (Corpataux
and Crevoisier, 2005b).
If financialization has, therefore, contributed to re-shaping the economic landscape, no
study truly sought to understand these transformations on the functioning of the real
estate/property market. While some authors (see, e.g. Orle´an, 1999, 2000; Boyer, 2000;
Froud et al., 2000; Lordon, 2000; Engelen, 2003; Aglietta & Rebe´rioux, 2004; Froud
et al., 2006) examine the effects of financialization on the economy, their analysis takes
no account of the property market. Furthermore, although major economic geography
studies associated with Clark (see, e.g. Hagerman et al., 2005, 2006) have looked at
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how some of the funds have played a part in regenerating urban centres, this group has
only looked indirectly at the consequences of financialization.
2.2 Pension Funds’ Growth, Financialization and Financial Markets’ Policies and
Strategies
Pension funds have become integral players in certain economies (the USA, Canada, UK,
Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland). In Switzerland, pension funds’ wealth peaked at
SFr491bn before the burst of the stock market bubble in 2000, but they still amounted to
SFr484bn in 2004. Since 1998, this saving exceeds the GDP. The increase in funds has
been accompanied by another phenomenon, the financialization of activities which is
tied in with the growth of institutional investors. This has impacted on the entire way in
which the economy and society have developed. Briefly, financialization means the con-
tinuous assessment of economic activities by financial markets (Orle´an, 1999). Tradition-
ally, the literature on financial systems distinguishes two stylized models: bank-based
financial system on the one side, and market-based financial system on the other side.
In the first model, financial evaluation is carried out by private bilateral relations
between firms and investors. In the second one, financial evaluation is made through
the anonymous action of an equity “market” and the procedure of evaluation is public,
i.e. realized by the financial community as a whole. However, with the increasing role
played by financial markets in most contemporary economies, this last option tends to
becoming more and more usual. Thus, firms become dependent on the opinion and on
the price of financial markets. Moreover, the finance industry uses really specific invest-
ment criteria (see Section 2.4 for further development on this last point) and in such a
context, it is less easy to use a greater diversity of criteria (financial or extra-financial)
than in a system where private bilateral relations dominate.
Furthermore, theory and policy are today concerned with increasing mobility and
liquidity within financial markets at the national as well as at the international level
(Corpataux & Crevoisier, 2005a). Most countries have implemented two types of
institutional reforms in order to increase the liquidity and mobility of financial capital.
Firstly, reforms eliminate regulatory barriers to free and perfect movements of capital.
Secondly, legal changes strengthen capital market efficiency by promoting transparency
within markets by guaranteeing good quality, publicly-available information.
At the same time, the modern theory of finance inspired by Markowitz (1959) directs
players towards diversification strategies which lead them to spread their portfolios over
a wider range of financial assets. The more financial markets develop and become more
liquid, the greater the scope for the practical application of the theory. Increased liquidity
and mobility reduces the risk created by the immobility of real capital, as it gives players in
the market the chance to move out of their investments at any time (Orle´an, 1999; Lordon,
2000; Corpataux & Crevoisier, 2005a). While the theory was primarily concerned with—
and applied to—the market for shares, it sought to provide a common standard for com-
paring different companies. From a theoretical perspective, listed companies are nothing
more than entities composed of liquid assets that can be bought or sold at any time on the
basis of a given set of standard and quantifiable criteria. The theory has now been extended
to other classes of assets. Thus, if the increase in capital mobility/liquidity and the prin-
ciple of diversification seems today jointly to play in favour of the internationalization of
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the portofolios (Theurillat et al., 2006, 2007), the same logic seems to apply to the seizure
of new sectors such as urban infrastructures (Torrance, 2006).
Nowadays, property investments have thus become a class of assets that are comparable
with investments in securities, and where attempts are made to apply the investment cri-
teria of risk and return used for securities to property.
2.3 Constructing a Financialized Property Market: Comparability and Liquidity
Today the Swiss property market is still extremely fragmented with a highly pronounced
regional character. Consequently it is not particularly liquid (transaction costs remain
high). Financial players are nevertheless exerting pressure to develop this market along
the lines of those for securities and international property through improving liquidity,
transparency and information. Traditionally, funds’ property investments are regional in
nature (given the problems of investing elsewhere) and direct property management is
often characterized by a financially passive approach, reflected by the infrequency of pur-
chases and sales.1 Indeed once bought or built, funds keep their properties for long periods
and property disposal policies are extremely uncommon (Altaprima & Ernst & Young,
2004). Financial players are calling for funds to be more active and to reassess their prop-
erty portfolios more often so they can be managed along the same lines as a securities port-
folio. In other words, for a buy and hold approach to be replaced by a buy and manage one.
The construction of a unified national market will be a source of liquidity and will mean
that property deals occur more often.
Some institutional managers active within the property sector, such as Swissca (2003),
are arguing for a number of reforms to increase the size of the Swiss property market and
to develop its liquidity. These include new collective investment vehicles, new products,
improving information and transparency, using new valuation methods based on dynamic
criteria and a more active, buy and manage approach to portfolio management.
A whole series of measures has been taken towards achieving greater comparability of
property and greater liquidity in property markets. Creating a national market effectively
requires the standardization of property accounting and valuation methods as a way of
reducing the opaque nature of regional property markets, thereby enabling different prop-
erties in different regions to be compared. Contemporary financial vocabulary has been
“institutionalized” in laws enacted since the late 1990s which embody the three main prin-
ciples of financial management. Indeed, the triptych of return, risk and liquidity is part of
current Swiss federal legislation governing pension funds’ investment criteria (namely the
LPP Act and the OPP2 Ordinance). Three concrete examples can be given of actions
aimed at greater comparability and liquidity/mobility in Swiss property markets:
In the first place, investors have, for several years, been using property indices as a
means of comparing the performance of market-listed investment vehicles.2 Since the
beginning of 2005, they have equally been able to use an index for investment foundations
with a property portfolio.
Secondly, a recent change to pension funds’ accounting standards,3 based on the prin-
ciple of comparability of risks and returns, fits in with a financialization framework for
funds’ property investments. The change means that all funds’ investments have to
reflect their current financial situation through valuations based on market values.
Thirdly, the 1994 Federal Investment Funds Act (LFP in French) is currently being
revised. It is due to be transformed into legislation covering a wider range of pooled
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capital investments (notably unit trust or mutual investment companies and limited part-
nership pooled investment companies). Among other things, it will favour the develop-
ment of pooled investment vehicles for property, thereby enabling liquidity to be
increased in various markets (De´partement fe´de´ral des finances, 2004).
In this context, property investments have become a class of assets comparable to
securities investments. The criteria used for property investment are identical for those
for securities on financial markets. After the occurrence of stock market problems at the
start of the new millennium, property has become an ideal investment because it serves
as a basis for pursuing diversification strategies. The research and studies that have
been carried out show that the correlation between the returns on property and those on
financial assets (shares and bonds) is low or even negative (e.g. Bender et al., 2001;
Hoesli, 2003). In line with what the theory recommends, property investment plays a
beneficial role in mixed investment portfolios (those with several classes of assets).
Consequently, it can be analysed from the viewpoint of returns and risk diversification.
Indeed, it is the aim of financial markets to provide a standardized means of looking at
the way property performs in various areas, both nationally and internationally. In line
with the dictum of not “putting all your eggs in one basket”, risk spreading is a way of
coming up with more baskets by introducing a greater geographical mix to portfolios!
2.4 The Various Meanings of Risk and Return in Finance and in the Real World
While fully-developed and liquid markets are a sine qua non for the proper functioning of
financial markets, finance has its own unique concepts of risk and return (Table 1). Risk
and return are the exclusive assessment criteria. However, these seemingly self-evident
terms do not have the same meaning in the real, non-financialized economy.
In the real economy, return is characterized by the accumulation and control of capital
over time, in other words in line with economic cycles, whether they are short (e.g. pro-
duction cycles) or long (product or technological cycles). Accumulation takes place at
different levels (company, regional, sectoral or national) in line with the organization of
production, consumption and real transactions. In the financial economy, return is not cal-
culated on the basis of real cycles over time (where time is required for a firm to reorganize
its production processes and for innovation to take place), but on the basis of comparative
returns which are continually assessed in relation to the returns on other financial market
investments. The assessment and valuation process is thus continuous and disconnected
from production-related time (Orle´an, 1999). In a nutshell, short-term dips and the
threat of pulling out are substituted for the productivity which comes from a commitment
made over time. Accumulation over time is replaced by mobility across space; the social
link of a stakeholder giving way to shareholder value. Involvement in a property or indus-
trial project having its own specific risks, and circumstances is replaced by an act invol-
ving the purchase of standardized financial assets in the form of securities.
Thus, while the introduction of greater uniformity in accounting standards is welcome,
several doubts can be raised over the way direct and indirect investments are compared.
For example, the concept of a “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory” return depends on the
basis on which comparisons and calculations are made along with factors like the time
horizon used in the appraisal process. During the 1990s, the growth in stock market
prices made investment in shares very attractive since financial markets continuously
assessed returns and, when markets were liquid, offered investors the possibility of
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being able to make quick disposals. Since the heavy fall in share prices at the start of 2000,
property investment has again become attractive for financial markets. (From the financial
industry’s perspective, the mistake was not to have lost money after investing in shares,
but to have turned in a worse performance than one indicated by the general stock
market index or to have used a diversification strategy turning out badly.) A comparison
over 15 or 20 years could be made between the performance of a market investment port-
folio and direct investments made in the real economy which avoided going through finan-
cial market channels. However, such a comparison is not “financial”, since one of the
stages of the investment decision bypasses financial markets. Such comparisons can
only be made in exceptional circumstances. Given that they have different meanings
according to whether the context is that of the real economy or of financial markets,
there is thus “return” and “return”.
More generally, to what extent do the indices for quoted and unquoted investment
vehicles reflect real property values? In other words, are “real” prices based on the capita-
lized yield values (rents) in line with prices on financial markets? While property valuations
can be made in an identical manner, given that pension funds and pooled investment
vehicles tend to use the same appraisal techniques (e.g. discounted cash flow (DCF)),4
there is little chance of the market values of quoted investment vehicles’ property portfolios
coinciding with real values. Up to 2000, when sentiment was in favour of securities markets,
the property market was under-valued and building stock values (the market values on real
Table 1. Comparison of property investment criteria between direct and financialized
investment channels.
Real economy (direct channel) Financialized economy
Basis of
calculation
Spatial and
temporal factors Basis of calculation
Spatial and
temporal factors
Return
(yield)
Expected future
project returns of
project
Time horizon for
real project,
accumulation;
place where project
is located
Comparison with
market indices (over-
or under-
performance)
Instantaneous and
comparable
profitability in a
globalized,
financialized
channel
Risk Industrial or
technological risk
or one linked to
market for goods
and services
Linked to where
project takes place
Can be given a
probability and be
reduced through
diversification
among asset classes
and between
countries where
trends are
uncorrelated
Creating an area
mix with
uncorrelated
patterns and trends
and which is
financialized
Liquidity High transaction
costs. Difficult to
assess prices of
transaction prices
Requirement for
physical proximity,
long process
Continuously
defined/worked out
price, low and known
transaction costs
Instant mobility
over long distance
by centralized and
IT-intensive
financial markets
Source: Own framework.
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property markets) were lower than stock market values (i.e. at a discount). Today, the
reverse is true, building stock values are higher than stock market (i.e. at a premium).
Does the same apply to unquoted investment vehicles in the sense that the index for
investment foundations belonging to the Confe´rence des Administrateurs de fondations
de placement (CAFP)5 corresponds to the DCF value of all the properties they own?
In the real economy, an entrepreneur’s risk-taking is hard to rationalize in terms of a
mathematical formula. The entrepreneur takes a view on a future which is not perfectly
known or knowable. Such uncertainty, which Keynes termed “fundamental”, covers a
future which is unknown, or is at least one where a mathematical probability cannot be
assigned to the event, and where it is impossible to list the future states of the world. In
conventional economic theory and the theory of finance, the notion of risk has a different
and specific meaning. Indeed, since Knight, the term “risk” has been applied to situations
where there is only imperfect knowledge of outcomes, but where all possible outcomes are
known a priori; in other words, it is possible to give a mathematical probability of the like-
lihood of each outcome occurring—all states of nature are known from the outset (For an
overview of the debates, see Moureau & Rivaud-Danset, 2004). Markowitz’s uncertain
universe corresponds to a risk than can be assessed in terms of a probability and is,
above all, a risk that can be reduced by following the appropriate diversification strategy.
For those who subscribe to an efficient financial markets hypothesis, these latter
approaches are said to be capable of working out, or correctly forecasting, the discounted
future income flows in a universe where probabilities can be calculated. The risk/return
pairing corresponds to a solution which can be found as an exercise in financial engineer-
ing. However, in the real world, it is extremely difficult to make a firm forecast of the
return and risk attached to purchasing a property or an industrial project.
3. The Importance of Pension Funds in the Swiss Property Sector and the Two
Channels of Investment
Along with securities, property has always been a major part of pension funds’ assets. In
2004, the funds’ wealth in terms of property was estimated at nearly SFr70bn, almost all of
it invested in Switzerland (Table 2). This represented 14% of total wealth (estimated to be
over SFr484bn). Despite a fall in the share accounted by property in the total wealth of
occupational pension funds (even though stock market difficulties at the start of the
new millennium saw property coming back into favour) amounts increased by more
than SFr25bn between 1992 and 2004.
Table 2. Property investment patterns of Swiss pension funds between 1992 and 2004
(SFR millions)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Total land and property 44’257 50’641 54’347 56’346 61’242 64’610 69’724
Switzerland and abroad
(%)
17 17 16 13 12 15 14
Total wealth 256’676 296’027 348’295 428’251 490’883 440’555 484’177
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: SFSO.
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Seventy-eight percent of property investment is still made through traditional invest-
ment channels. As Table 3 shows, pension funds had rights over, and management respon-
sibilities for, a building stock valued at SFr52bn in 2004. However, there was also an
increase in the use of indirect investment methods during the study period, accompanied
by a sharp rise in the amounts invested; this market has grown from a 5% share in 1992 to
22% in 2004 (from SFr2.4bn in 1992 to SFr15bn in 2004). Moreover, this rise was quite
strong between 2002 and 2004.
Hence there are two channels with differing operational and spatial processes for prop-
erty management and investment activities. We describe these two channels in the next
part.
3.1 Channel A: Direct Management, Based on In-House Skills and Characterized by
Proximity
This first channel can be termed direct or traditional, as it applies to funds with a policy of
in-house property investment management where investments are made directly. Funds
thus hold the property rights to, and have operational responsibility for, their property
investments.
3.1.1 Decentralized skills
Special skills are required for direct property management and indeed for property pur-
chases and construction. These are both technical (architectural, building standards,
urban planning, law, etc.) and financial (property valuation, tax, etc.). In this case, one
or more people inside the pension fund are concerned with managing its property
estate. The use of in-house staff and skills in the areas mentioned above depends
closely on the size of the fund and the importance of its property portfolio.
While real property can account, on average, for 15% of a fund’s wealth, the sums
remain relatively modest for the small and medium-sized funds. Property can be a
fairly narrow part of their portfolios, ranging from a few properties to maybe 10 or
even 15 (but rarely much more than this). Only the large funds have a critical mass
which allows them to have a proper in-house investment policy covering dozens or
even hundreds of buildings, thereby enabling them to use a team having all the necessary
skills. While pension funds can sometimes act as project managers in property develop-
ments,6 they usually buy property that has already been built. Generally, unlike other
Table 3. Pension funds’ property investments (1992–2004, SFR millions)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Direct investments
Switzerland 41’627 47’486 49’685 50’647 51’623 53’960 52’558
% of funds invested in property (%) 95 94 92 91 86 85 78
Indirect/collective investments
Switzerland 2’411 2’941 4’393 5’292 8’446 9’566 15’038
% of funds invested in property (%) 5 6 8 9 14 15 22
Funds invested in property 44’038 50’427 54’078 55’939 60’069 63’526 67’596
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: SFSO.
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institutional investors like property funds—and property investment companies7 in
particular—pension funds’ investment strategies are characterized by a buy-and-hold
type behaviour. Once properties are bought or built, they remain in the funds’ ownership
for a long period, and a policy of property disposals is rare (Altaprima & Ernst & Young,
2004, p. 18).
In order for the required occupancy rate to be achieved, it is important that no mistakes
are made in the choice of building and location. Thus, a major part of a property deal is the
analytical stage of assessing property purchases or construction projects. This relies on
specialist geographical knowledge of property markets. As urban property markets
become increasingly complex, and institutional investors (banks, insurance companies
and pension funds) develop and evolve, pension funds commonly draw on specialist
players who have emerged within the sector. Indeed, when funds require strategic (or
specific) skills in areas like portfolio operations (brokers), building development projects
(engineers, architects, etc.), property trusts (certified accountants, financiers), etc., they
call on external, centralized expertise which is often city-based and mainly in the country’s
major urban centres. Three-quarters of institutions make use of outside experts as part of
their property investment policy, with the biggest institutions often being the greatest users
(Altaprima & Ernst & Young, 2004, p. 44). This should come as no surprise given that they
often manage large portfolios which are often subject to change. During the process of
analysing and assessing the value of a building, the various specialists base their judge-
ments on the basic issues surrounding any property investment. These can be set out in
the following stylized manner:
. The building’s specifics: the buildings own characteristics such as its age, the number
and area of flats/rooms, building materials used, various installations (lift, garages,
various amenities), etc.
. The building’s location: this includes the immediate environment of the building’s
location together with the local and regional environment. In the first case, this refers
to the locality’s characteristics in terms of centrality (services and shops, leisure facili-
ties, closeness to the city centre), socio-professional make-up, accessibility (roads,
public transport) and quality of life (noise, pollution, recreational spaces, etc). The
second concerns the contexts of, and perspectives for, a city and region in terms of econ-
omic development (mainly for the commercial sector) and socio-demographic patterns
(mainly for the residential sector).
For purely property management-related activities, namely administrative responsibilities
concerned with tenant relations in matters like renting and refurbishment, management
can be either internal or external. In the first case, the funds can use their own in-house
management for the buildings they own in various localities and regions. In the second
case, they can pass over the management of all or part of their building stock to property
management companies. Such contracting out is of little or no importance since it con-
cerns skills which are not regarded as strategic, given that funds still remain with the build-
ings’ owners.
3.1.1 Investment spaces
For many funds, property is a market centred around the notion of proximity. Conse-
quently, Swiss pension funds’ investments are primarily at the regional or cantonal
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level (administratively, a canton is broadly comparable to a US state). According to a
Swissca (2004, p. 41) survey, 60% of pension funds reported that their property invest-
ments were close to the employer. Only 13% said that their investments could be made
in areas other than those where the employer was based and for independent third party
users. A closer look at the spatial aspects of direct investments can be made by using
recent data for five large funds, all with a property portfolio. Taken together, these
funds own 822 buildings (primarily residential but with some commercial properties)
with a total value of SFr5.99bn.
Three reasons can be put forward to explain why spatial proximity has been important.
Historically, property investments were determined by businesses and their employees,
with the general aim of funding employee accommodation. In a world where there
was not yet a fully-developed finance industry, the very idea of investing in another
region could hardly be justified. On the contrary, such behaviour could lead to the
local economy being undermined. The property-proximity link can be seen, for
example, in the activities of ASCOM, a large, Berne-based Swiss company involved
in the digital communication and security systems industries. During its history it has
taken over companies in the Fribourg, Neuchaˆtel, Solothurn and Vaud cantons, and
this geographical make-up is still reflected in the properties owned by its pension fund
(Figure 1).
A second explanation, which emerged from interviews with fund managers, is the
importance of knowledge of local property markets. Generally speaking, Swiss property
markets remain highly compartmentalized. There is a lack of clarity concerning infor-
mation on prices and property characteristics, and local factors continue to be a major
influence on regulations. Most property within the portfolio thus continues to be located
in the region of origin of the company and its pension fund, as is the case for the
pension funds for Siemens Switzerland (Figure 2) and for Migros, Switzerland’s
leading distribution group (Figure 3).
Figure 1. Properties owned by the ASCOM pension fund
Source: Ascom Pension Fund 2004 Annual Report.
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With regard to Migros’ pension fund—whose property portfolio is a large as that of the
country’s biggest property fund and which owns shopping centres across the country—
investments are closely linked to the areas where the group’s main offices are based,
namely in the Aargau, Zurich and Lausanne Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs).
A third explanation stems from the fact that public sector pension funds are often large
and that they generally directly manage their property activities. Public sectors funds, by
Figure 2. Properties owned by Siemens’ pension fund
Source: Siemens Pension Fund Website.
Figure 3. Properties owned by Migros’s pension fund
Source: Migros Pension Fund 2003 Annual Report.
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the fact that they are in principle subject to political control and because of the active role
that employees play in fund management, pursue a proximity-based strategy. While the
Neuchaˆtel canton pension fund’s investments appear to be more evenly spread among
the canton’s various districts (Figure 4), those for the Vaud canton’s pension fund are
heavily concentrated around the Lake Geneva area, notably along a line running from
Morges to Vevey/Montreux (Figure 5).
Figure 4. Properties owned by the Neuchaˆtel canton’s pension fund
Source: Neuchaˆtel Canton Pension Fund 2003 Annual Report.
Figure 5. Properties owned by the Vaud canton’s pension fund
Source: Vaud Canton Pension Fund 2003 Annual Report.
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Underlying pension funds’ direct investments is a proximity-based process whose scope
varies, firstly, according to the importance of the property portfolio and, secondly, accord-
ing to the fund’s legal status:
. Pooled or combined public sector funds: the investments of small public sector funds (in
other words, municipal funds) are made at local or even at council level (such as the
pension funds for the cities of Neuchaˆtel and Basel). The investments of the biggest
public sector funds (i.e. the cantons’ pension funds) are made at regional/cantonal
level. The degree to which investments are evenly distributed can depend on the strength
or weakness of the fund’s dependence on the canton (independent funds or those
dependent on the canton’s organizations). As for the main national-level public sector
fund (namely the Publica pension fund which had a property portfolio of SFr1.27bn
at the end of 2004)8, its investment practices should follow a nationwide pattern.
. Private sector pension funds: the investments of small and medium-sized private sector
funds—independent, merged or company pension funds—are mainly made at local level
(municipality or districts within a canton). Investments made by the large private sector
funds with significant property portfolios (mainly funds tied to companies) can be made
in several regions. The geographical pattern generally results from mergers and acqui-
sitions that have been made during the course of the company’s history.
3.2. Channel B: Financialized Management—Delegation and Distance
This second channel can be described as indirect or financialized. It attracts pension fund
investments that are made through a collective property investment vehicle. As a result,
management is devolved and investments are made indirectly through being pooled.
This means that property rights and property management responsibilities are vested in
the investment vehicle.
3.2.1 Centralized skills networks
Funds can opt to pass on all their property management responsibilities and simply act as
investors. Under Swiss law, they can acquire shares in two types of collective institution.
First, they can decide to invest via the market through having shares in property funds9 and
property companies. Second, there is the possibility of investing in what are known as
investment foundations, which are reserved solely for pension funds and other recognized
institutions.10 The most important investment foundations are members of an umbrella
group known as the CAFP. They are not listed on the stock market and pension funds
often acquire an interest through contributions in kind. All these institutions have the
staff and technical skills that a property investment strategy needs (engineers, architects,
property experts, brokers, lawyers, etc.). Because of this, their investments are direct with
an internal team being responsible for property purchases, sales and construction. Apart
from a few funds (notably the La Foncie`re investment fund) all the institutions involved
in indirect property investment are based in Zurich. This centralization of property man-
agement implies that adequate knowledge of regional property markets is available. These
institutions thus rely on a chain of property management personnel, either as affiliates or
partners,11 who have the local knowledge needed for identifying good opportunities for
selling and buying properties and for site redevelopment.
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Some institutions, especially those involved in making investments abroad, often rely
on indirect investment procedures. This means that collective investors are no longer prop-
erty owners but have an interest in—or acquire shares in—other institutions (quoted or
unquoted property funds and property companies, etc.).
In the light of disappointing stock market performances over the last few years, property
is once again back in fashion as an asset. Consequently, in line with what would be
expected from the processes behind diversification strategies, pension funds have made
use of all indirect investment possibilities. However, they have mainly gone for property
funds and investment foundations. Although the funds can be major shareholders in stock
market-quoted property companies, it has been less common for them to acquire holdings
in these companies (Robeco, 2002; Lusenti, 2003).
Collective investment vehicles’ property portfolio structures are based on the key
principle of modern portfolio theory, namely the strategy of risk diversification. Property
markets can be segmented either geographically or by sector, with each segment having
its own market cycle and specific risks. Consequently, the make-up of property portfolios
is generally examined from a twofold perspective: how allocations are made and the
geographical spread of properties. Investors, i.e. pension funds, can thus diversify their
portfolios according to what is on offer. Through the case examined here, it will be
seen how the risk diversification principle is put into action. The analysis covers the
main players working within indirect investment channels, namely the four biggest
property foundations (or property investment foundations), the three investment
foundations having an internal direct property investment policy and the eight largest
property funds. Data have been obtained covering their numbers, types of allocations
made, the market values of properties and areas where the properties are located.12 The
channels being looked at involved 2004 Swiss-based properties valued at more than
SFr20.1bn.
3.2.2 Diversification by type of allocation
Indirect investment foundations provide products or funds offering varying degrees of
specialization. The products offered by property funds and investment foundations are
almost entirely centred on residential or commercial property (including offices and
small shopping centres) or take the form of mixed funds, where the split between residen-
tial and commercial properties varies. As for the portfolios of stock market-quoted prop-
erty companies, these are almost exclusively centred on commercial property and still
closely match the portfolios first established by those who set up the companies.13 Only
UBS’s mixed funds contain industrial property among the properties on its books. On
the other hand, no fund offers portfolios containing large shopping centres or buildings
serving the tourist sector (hotels, restaurants, ski lifts in alpine resorts, etc.). In short,
for the investor, portfolio diversification according to allocation is limited to two main
segments, residential and commercial.
3.2.3 Geographical diversification
In accordance with the property-type allocations linked to investment products, the various
collective investment institutions engage in risk diversification through a geographical
spread of property. What characterizes the geography of diversification? Is it a broad
process, spread more or less evenly across the whole country, or does it favour certain
areas? From a quick overview, and even when investment values are weighted by their
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TTWA populations, it emerges that spatial diversification is limited solely to certain areas
(Figure 6).14
Investments are spread across a large number of Swiss TTWAs, but are primarily con-
centrated in the country’s urban areas. All major urban areas located on the Swiss plateau
and in the Italian-speaking Ticino canton have market values per head between SFr1000
and SFr4000. The pattern is even more pronounced when the main metropolitan areas of
Basel, Geneva, Lausanne and Zurich (Berne falling in the intermediate range) are exam-
ined. The latter areas all have values exceeding SFr4000 per resident, with the biggest con-
centration being in areas around Zurich. As can be seen from looking at a line running
from Geneva to Vevey/Montreux, the TTWAs along Lake Geneva can also be identified
as areas with significant investment concentrations. Less urbanized areas—and peripheral
areas even more so—are much less well represented. In short, the following geographical
structures can be identified:
. The Lake Geneva metropolitan axis
. The Swiss Plateau axis: running from Yverdon to St Gall via Berne, Basel and Zurich
and then extending beyond to Coire
. The Ticino metropolitan axis running from Bellinzone to Lugano.
Hence, regardless of the degree of specialization for investment products (in terms of
the split between residential and commercial properties), collective investment vehicles
have a focused geographical vision centred on urban areas, particularly the larger urban
areas. Thus, there is primarily a focus on areas recognized as centres of activity and
that they follow an urban-based hierarchy (Figure 7). Outside these areas, investment is
almost non-existent. By analogy with the stock market, we can talk of “blue chip” and
“small/midcap” areas which are plugged into the investment network and “unquoted”
Figure 6. 2004 analysis of property owned by the 15 biggest players using indirect investment
channels (as of 2003/2004)
Source: Annual Reports.
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areas similar to SMEs in areas characterized by industry and tourism (which these days
experience problems in obtaining finance). It may be wondered why investments are
made in these centres of activity when there is no evidence available on the comparative
inter-regional profitability of property investments of a given duration. Investment
“pockets” seem to depend on financial players’ actions and whims, which appear to
play a central role in the way areas are selected. It is a process in which urban areas
seem very well placed, making it easy to justify and market financial products.
3.3. Limits to Transferring a Share-Based Model to Property or to Constructing
Comparability and Liquidity
Can the indirect investment channel really transcend compartmentalized property markets
so that investors can make investments independent of specific local circumstances, thus
making property investment management liquid?
3.3.1 Restriction of liquidity in real property markets
Buying, selling or constructing property is by no means straightforward. Choosing a build-
ing requires specific technical and financial skills. Regardless of whether these activities
are conducted in-house by the pension fund or passed over to a collective institution, it
is important that the right choice is made so that the building can be fully let and can
provide the required return. While the price at the time of a sale depends on economic con-
ditions (supply and demand), the buildings themselves are heterogeneous on account of
various characteristics associated with their nature and location. It is difficult to
compare a property located in Geneva with one in Glaris, or even between properties in
the same town or city; or indeed ones in the same locality. The property market has
Figure 7. Spatial pattern of Swiss pension funds’ property investments (1992–2005)
Source: Own outline.
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strong regional and local characteristics which give it a fragmented nature. It is, further-
more, a market based on mutual agreement, where research and feasibility study costs,
along with transaction costs, are very high.
Within a framework where collective investment institutions act as both investors and
proprietors, the anticipated return on a building arises from the rental income it generates.
This means that the purchase and construction of property is seen within a long-term
perspective, even though, by their nature, some property investment vehicles (property
companies or property funds) engage in property speculation within the commercial
sector. Consequently, the various levels of property deals have to conform to current
standards (building, development and planning, legislation in area like lease rights, etc.).
If standards in areas like taxation (transfer tax) are added to the picture, the result is that
only very limited liquidity within the market is possible and that real returns cannot be
moulded at will. Given the real difficulties surrounding property deals, collective
institutions equally behave in the same buy and hold manner as pension funds acting as
investors and managers (and for which they have been criticized). The financialization
of real property thus turns out to be not as easy to achieve as was anticipated. Furthermore,
as discussed below, property-related financial markets are still under-developed in
Switzerland.
3.3.2 Restrictions on financial markets’ liquidity
Funds have two options. First, they can choose to invest through financial markets, which,
because of their liquidity, are supposed to enable an active management strategy to be
pursued (the buy and manage approach). Alternatively, they can take up their allotted
shares in investment foundations. In the first instance, it remains the case that the Swiss
market is still restricted.15 In the second case, the main advantage of unquoted investment
vehicles, namely their ability to avoid the irrationalities of the market (Cre´dit Suisse, 2003,
p. 40), is cancelled out by their lack of liquidity. Indeed, entry and exit can be even more
problematic given that there is no secondary market.16 In this case, the investor faces a
whole set of drawbacks; those arising from financial markets and those linked to real
property markets.
All of this could explain, in part, why only 22% of the pension funds’ investing in
the Swiss property market happens through an indirect, financialized channel and, thus,
even if the part invested in this way grew from 5% to 22% in 12 years, especially
from 15% in 2002 to 22% in 2004. Moreover, the Swiss property market seems saturated
today. Some urban regions, especially the French-speaking part of the country (Lausanne
and Geneva above all), witnessed these last years an important housing shortgage as well as
an important inflation in housing prices. Thus, considering that collective institutions
mainly invest in already constructed housing and invest only a small part of their funds
in the construction of new buildings, to make them responsible, in part, for the recent
inflation in housing prices could constitute a reasonable hypothesis for future research.
3.3.3 Restrictions linked to the territorial representation of financial players and the push
to conformity
The other advantage of the indirect channel, namely better risk management through port-
folio diversification, as a way of getting round the lack of geographical diversification of
pension funds’ direct investments does not also stand up to empirical scrutiny (Figure 7). It
was seen that certain areas and certain types of allocation were favoured when investments
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passed through financialized channels. Thus, whether one is banking on long-term returns
through rents or short-term returns through realizing capital gains, the picture painted by
collective-type investment instruments is a territorially targeted one which is focused on
the country’s main urban areas, and moreover, inside these few areas, on a few urban quar-
ters. However, according to portfolio diversification theory, should not there then be
greater diversity in terms of areas and allocations? Investments made in peripheral
regions or sectors like tourism can be wholly justified and be in line with the theory
because non-systematic risk can be offset by the systematic risk linked to the entire port-
folio. The investments of various collective investment vehicles are based on financial
market criteria. So is it only the case that the country’s urban areas, particularly the metro-
politan areas of Basel, Berne, Geneva, Lausanne and Zurich, are the only ones able to meet
the conditions of the criteria and to offer advantageous returns at a low risk? There is
nothing to say that this is the case.
It should be nevertheless noted that going down the route of financial markets leads to a
push in the direction of conformity in terms of the choice of financial products on offer
from collective fund managers. Indeed, in situations of crisis, for example, a fund
manager will not be challenged if their poor results are in line with those of other fund
managers. By contrast, unsatisfactory short- and medium-term results, compared with
other managers’ markedly better results, can cost a manager their job. Consequently,
when it comes to making investment decisions, a fund manager finds it difficult to go
against the prevailing “consensus”.
In short, it can be said that institutions within the indirect investment channel are acting
in the same way as directly-investing pension funds. The only notable exception being that
the relevant areas considered for investment are the country’s main urban areas, or the
ones close to financial players (as opposed to areas that are close to the pension funds).
4. Conclusion: The Financialization of the Property Sector
In 2004, the traditional investment channel was still the most common form, characterized
by funds acting as both investors and having direct responsibility for all property manage-
ment issues. For political or historical reasons, but especially for reasons tied in with
having specialist knowledge of property assets, property purchases, sales and construction
were carried out at the local or regional level. In every single instance (especially when
deals turn out badly), the funds’ in-house property portfolio managers make their cases
before the funds’ boards. This is followed by a specific examination of the special charac-
teristics and circumstances of the properties along with their respective yields. In other
words, it is a situation where “voice” is possible (Hirschman, 1986) and gives rise to a
set-up where players involved at all levels within the fund can discuss matters. Further-
more, given the complex nature of property transactions (in areas like valuations,
putting together financial packages, finding the required players, transaction taxes, etc.),
these discussions are necessarily lengthy. For the investor, specifically the fund
manager, there is a lock-in effect.
The indirect, financialized investment channel differs fundamentally from the tra-
ditional norm represented by the proximity-based approach. Indeed, the process by
which management is devolved is both operationally and spatially standardized. Manage-
ment and property investment skills are centralized, mainly in Zurich. Moreover, from
2002 to 2003 the use of outside management appears to have increased. Indeed, many
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funds have, for example, ceased managing their own portfolios by taking shares in the
three property funds managed by the Zurich-based Pensimo Management.17 When
pension funds acquire shares in various investment vehicles, the aim is to pass all property
management responsibilities to an outside institution and thus to act simply as investors. In
this framework, pension fund board decisions on property investment are tantamount to
using comparative indices for buying and selling shares.
At a theoretical level, the argument put forward was concerned with the relations
between the financialization of the economy and spatial organization and development.
Financialization enables projects, players and spaces to be compared, but it makes the
relationship between the holders of capital and the real investor distant and opaque. Finan-
cialization centralizes the management of the economy in a number of financial centres
and favours the concentration of investment in major cities. Finally, it standardizes man-
agement criteria and places them in a hierarchy. As a result, certain real economy cri-
teria—such as the technical specificity of investments, their location and, more
generally, their characteristics—are no longer considered as being relevant. The result
is a homogenization of the economic development process, which militates against inno-
vation and decentralization (Crevoisier, 1999), both of which are, by definition, under-
pinned by a notion of differentiation. Indeed, the finance industry develops through
favouring the integration of space (the abolition of borders), through standardizing the
way projects and areas are analysed and, lastly, through different areas (national and inter-
national) having identical legislation. By finance, we mean the institutions that allow
investments to be disconnected from investors by making the two remote from each
other in a way that means that the investor’s choice is solely determined by risk and
return in the financial sense of the terms. Finance is the whole set of conventions which
make it possible for financial capital (as opposed to real capital) to be mobile (or
“liquid”, as financiers would say) in the short-term and over long distances. The finance
industry is to capital what the transport industry is to people and goods: it unifies
markets, makes products comparable and, as a result, increases competition while enabling
economies of scale and the centralization or concentration of economic power to take
place (Corpataux & Crevoisier, 2001).
The case study of the Swiss pension fund property sector shows that financialization is
not a phenomenon which affects the entire sector uniformly. It occurs at various rates and
in different spaces. It also primarily attracts certain players (the smallest funds and more
recently, the biggest funds which are close to the financial community); it invests in par-
ticular types of property (large residential and potentially commercial properties) which
are situated in the country’s three or four biggest urban centres.
But there are also limits on how far financialization can go because of the particularities
of the Swiss property sector and the institutions working within it. In the property sector,
high transaction costs (which cannot be put down to the tax system!) mean that owners
are forced to keep their properties over a long period and to take a long-term view in
estimating real returns. In a sector where rents move only slowly, and where costs are
primarily financial, it is difficult to achieve rapid increases in income or cost reductions
as a response to the wishes of financial markets. It is equally difficult to overcome the
opaque nature of local markets, where players hold on to information and where highly
specific local laws and regulations continue to remain.
Since 1985, when the second pillar of Switzerland’s so-called three-pillar retirement
provision system was established, the amount at the disposal of pension funds has
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grown significantly. Property investment has followed suit, but to a lesser degree. Today,
property investment has become attractive again because of the fall in share values at the
start of 2000. Not only are the returns on property no longer considered as being poor, but
property is increasingly being associated with the virtues of diversification (again along
the lines of the portfolio theory) as there tends to be a low correlation between property
investments and other classes of assets.
With regard to this last point, the watchword is caution. Indeed, we have seen the extent
to which investments are highly concentrated geographically. In this sense, it may be
feared that pension funds are intensifying a property bubble, in the same way as they con-
tributed to the rise in the stock market in the 1990s by investing considerable amounts in
shares. . . and the property sector that would be affected by such a bubble is one with an
extremely narrow range.
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Notes
1. This does not mean that funds cannot be highly active within real investment channels—for example,
being involved in many building projects.
2. The SWX Immofonds index covers all quoted Swiss investment funds. As for the SWX Real Estate
Index, it contains property companies listed on the Swiss stock market (Cre´dit Suisse, 2005).
3. In order to standardize accounting standards at the national level and to make them compatible with
international standards, an accounting concept inspired by practices used in the English-speaking
world has been developed to cover both large and small businesses (the Swiss GAAP RPC26).
The use of new accounting standards in property has led to changes in the methods and frequency of
valuations. Since 1 January 2005, pension funds must use the new accounting standards (Meyer &
Teitler, 2004).
4. According to the DCF method, the monetary value calculation incorporates factors such as refurbish-
ment costs which will be attributed over several years or future rent increases. In this method, the deter-
mining factor is the net return from future cash flows discounted at a risk-adjusted rate (Swisscanto,
2005, p. 14).
5. There are nineteen major investment foundations in Switzerland which belong to the CAFP (Confe´rence
des Administrateurs de Fondations de Placement or Investment Foundation Directors’ Conference).
Among the investment foundations are those affiliated to banks and insurance companies and those
which run a direct property investment policy, plus independent foundations known as property
foundations.
6. In 2003, institutional property investment (by property funds, insurance companies, investment foun-
dations and pension funds) mainly involved purchases, with involvement in new buildings and projects
being of secondary importance. Of the SFr7.6bn invested in property in 2003, around SFr6.9bn was
directly invested (65% in purchases and 35% in new development projects). The remainder (around
SFr1.3bn) was invested indirectly (Altaprima & Ernst & Young, 2004, p. 17).
7. The aim of these institutions is to make capital gains from property transactions.
8. Following a public sector reorganization in 1998, the funds for public sector enterprises such as the
postal service, CFF (the Swiss rail service) and Swisscom are governed by private law.
9. Property funds are generally affiliated to banks.
10. An investment foundation’s investors are limited to the so-called second and third pillar institutions:
pension funds, vested pension institutions, bodies known as institutions supple´tives (state-regulated
bodies for employers who do not meet the requirements for having a registered pension fund), security
funds, investment foundations, benefit funds, finance foundations and banking foundations which come
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under what is known as the third pillar A—see the Office Fe´deral de Assurances Sociales/Federal Social
Insurance Office (OFAS, 1999).
11. As with pension funds, various institutions can have their own property management set-up in the areas
where the properties are located for carrying out administrative and management tasks (renting, refurb-
ishment, tenant relations, etc.). Alternatively, they can rely on outside management or partners.
12. Property companies have not been considered given that pension funds have made little use of these
institutions.
13. These companies arose as a result of a contracting-out process by industrial and/or commercial firms and
banks and insurance companies, the aim being to get them listed on the stock market. For example,
Allreal is a spin-off from Oerlikon Bu¨hrle, PSP Swiss Property a spin-off from Zurich Assurance and
Swiss Prime Site a spin-off from Cre´dit Suisse.
14. The map refers to all property (residential, mixed or commercial) owned via the two main indirect invest-
ment channels in which funds can hold an interest together with property owned by quoted and unquoted
investment vehicles (the former being investment funds with 1250 properties worth SFr12.5bn and the
latter being investment foundations with 388 properties worth SFr4.2bn) and property foundations (366
properties valued at SFr3.4bn).
15. The stock market value of property securities only represented less than 1.5% of shares in the Swiss Per-
formance Index (SFr1257bn at the end of 2000). The same proportion only accounts for around 1% of the
total Swiss property market (Bender et al., 2001).
16. Firstly, the investor can sell their holdings by finding a buyer. It goes without saying that conditions of
sale and the directly-negotiated market price depends on economic conditions. Secondly, shares held
by the investor can be bought back by the investment foundation. This purchase is made at book
value and the process is fairly long as it depends on giving several months’ notice before the end of
the current year. The delay can be even longer if the amounts being bought back are significant. Further-
more, there is a sales commission for the transaction (Cre´dit Suisse, 2003).
17. For Pensimo’s Turidomus Foundation (large shares) the pension funds of Nestle´, Swissair and the Swiss
postal service (La Poste) can be given as examples. For the Pensimo Foundation (medium shares) the
pension funds for the Lucerne canton and the city of Zurich can be mentioned, while the pension
funds of Grisons and Zoug cantons can be cited in the case of Imoka Foundation (small shares).
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